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PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE-LIMITATION OF AC-
TIONS-ARKANSAS EXTENDS THE OCCURRENCE RULE TO' ACCOUNT-
ANTS AND RECOGNIZES A TOLLING PROVISION IN ATTORNEY MAL-
PRACTICE ACTIONS. Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark.
426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989); Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763
S.W.2d 76 (1989).*
In Arkansas the statute of limitations for attorney and physician
malpractice begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong,
when the negligence occurs.' The Arkansas Supreme Court has ex-
tended this established "occurrence" rule' to professional malpractice
claims against accountants.' Also, the court has created an exception to
the occurrence rule and suspended the running of the statute of limita-
tions when an injury ceases to exist for a period of time."
In 1973 Ford's Inc.5 (hereinafter "Ford's") hired the accounting
firm of Russell Brown & Co.6 (hereinafter "Russell Brown").for advice
on the liquidation of its business on a tax-free basis.7 Relying upon
Russell Brown's recommendations given in August 1974, Ford's liqui-
dated and distributed its company's assets.' Russell Brown prepared
the final tax return which reflected a tax-free liquidation.9
In late 1976 or early 1977 the Internal Revenue Service (hereinaf-
ter "IRS") began auditing Ford's returns.'" After several conferences
and the filing of protests by Ford's, the IRS assessed additional taxes
* The author wishes to thank Sherry P. Bartley of the Little Rock law firm of Mitchell,
Williams, Selig & Tucker for her counsel and guidance in the writing of this note.
1. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988); Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148,
671 S.W.2d 756 (1984).
2. See infra notes 61-110 and accompanying text.
3. Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989).
4. Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989).
5. Ford's Inc. was a family-owned-and-operated farming business in the Newport area of
Arkansas. Telephone interview with Robert K. Walsh, Dean of the Wake Forest University
School of Law (Mar. 9, 1990) (Dean Walsh, formerly with the law firm of Friday, Eldredge &
Clark, served as counsel for Russell Brown & Co. in this lawsuit).
6. Russell Brown & Co. was acquired on January 1, 1982, by the accounting firm of Ar-
thur Young (now Ernst & Young). Telephone interview with Denis D. Wewers, partner with the
accounting firm of Ernst & Young (Mar. 30, 1990).
7. Ford's Inc., 299 Ark. at 427, 773 S.W.2d at 91.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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and interest with respect to the liquidation in the amount of $648,000
plus interest."1
In January 1978 the IRS notified Ford's that it owed a tax defi-
ciency. Russell Brown recommended that Ford's accept a proposed set-
tlement. 2 Later that same year, the IRS imposed additional taxes and
interest."3
Ford's brought suit against Russell Brown on September 4, 1981,
for damages incurred as a result of the accounting firm's erroneous ad-
vice." ' The Circuit Court of Craighead County entered summary judg-
ment in favor of Russell Brown on the grounds that the three-year stat-
ute of limitations15 governing professional malpractice actions barred
Ford's claim.' 6 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held
that the limitations period began to run in August 1974, when Russell
Brown gave the advice, seven years before the plaintiff brought its
claim.'7 Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co.,. 299 Ark. 426, 773
S.W.2d 90 (1989).
On September 27, 1982, Richard A. Stroud handed his attorney,
Jerry Ryan, a writ of garnishment which had been served on Stroud
earlier that day. 8 Ryan failed to respond to the writ within the twenty-
day time period allowed resident defendants,"9 and the trial court is-
sued a default judgment against Stroud on November 3 for
$22,674.01.1o Two years later, on December 4, 1984, the trial court set
aside the default judgment nunc pro tunc" following Ryan's motion on
behalf of Stroud.2" On February 19, 1986, the Arkansas Court of Ap-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (1987) provides in pertinent part: "The following actions
shall be commenced within three (3) years after the cause of action accrues: . . . (3) All actions
founded on any contract or liability, expressed or implied.
16. Ford's Inc., 299 Ark. at 426, 773 S.W.2d at 91.
17. Id. at 430, 773 S.W.2d at 93.
18. Stroud, 297 Ark. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
19. ARK. R. Civ. P. 12 provides in pertinent part: "(a) A defendant shall file his answer
within twenty (20) days after the service of summons and complaint upon him ..
20. Stroud, 297 Ark. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
21. Nunc.pro tunc is a latin term meaning "now for then." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 964
(5th ed. 1979). In this case, the summary judgment "shall have [the] same legal force and effect
as if [it was] done at [the] time when it ought to have been done." Id. (citing State v. Hatley, 72
N.M. 377, 380, 384 P.2d 252, 254 (1963)).
22. Stroud, 297 Ark. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
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peals reversed this order and reinstated the default judgment.2" Follow-
ing the appellate decision, the judgment creditor sought execution of
the judgment against Stroud in the amount of $31,988.45.4
Ryan continued his representation of Stroud in this matter until
March 1986.25 Stroud received repeated assurances from Ryan that
Ryan's malpractice insurance would pay for the judgment should the
court refuse to set it aside." However, Ryan failed to disclose to Stroud
that the three-year statute of limitations' for professional negligence
might bar any attempted recovery from Ryan.2
Stroud filed a complaint against Ryan on December 18, 1986, al-
leging attorney malpractice.29 In his answer, Ryan asserted the statute
of limitations as a defense.30 The Circuit Court of Polk County found
that the three-year statute of limitations barred the complaint and
granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Ryan."'
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the
running of the statute of limitations was tolled during the fourteen and
one-half months the default judgment was set aside. 2 This tolling of
the statute brought the complaint within the limitations period. Stroud
v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989).
It has been said that a dual policy operates in professional mal-
practice cases. This policy attempts to balance the protection of profes-
sionals from the danger of stale claims3 3 against the protection of cli-
ents from types of negligence which may be difficult to determine
within the statutory limitations period.3 4 As a result of these competing
23. Id.
24. This amount represents the principal judgment plus interest accrued from the date of
the default judgment. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (1987).
28. Stroud, 297 Ark. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77. Jerry Ryan was elected Municipal Judge in
Mena, Arkansas, on May 1, 1989, and is serving a four-year term. Telephone interview with
Municipal Court Clerk of Mena, Arkansas (Mar. 30, 1990).
29. Stroud, 297 Ark. at 474, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
30. Id. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 474, 763 S.W.2d at 78.
33. 2 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.1, at 67 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinaf-
ter MALLEN & SMITH]. "Statutes of Limitation are intended to promote promptness and punctu-
ality in business; the settlement of claims while parties are alive; before papers are lost and wit-
nesses die; and he who will not take the hint, must take the consequences." Id. (quoting Glenn v.
Cuttle, 48 Pa. 524, 2 Grant Cas. 273, 276 (1853)).
34. Annotation, Application of Statute of Limitations to Damage Actions Against Public
19901
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policies, courts have reached various conclusions as to when the statute
of limitations begins to run in professional malpractice cases. 5
Actions against accountants38 and attorneys may lie in either con-
tract or tort depending on the nature of the complaint and the inter-
ests"7 to be protected.38 Because the statute of limitations has been one
of the most effective defenses used by accountants and attorneys to de-
fend against malpractice actions,39 it is vital to know which statute ap-
plies, contract or tort, and when the applicable statute begins to run.4 0
In determining which cause of action applies, Arkansas courts look
to the purposes surrounding the law of both contracts and torts.' "The
purpose of the law of contracts is to see that promises are performed,"
while "the law of torts provides redress for various injuries."42
The hybrid nature of a cause of action for professional malprac-
tice"3 has resulted in differing approaches in determining the applicable
statute of limitations. 4' Regarding attorney malpractice claims, some
courts disregard the tort aspects of the claim, finding instead the exis-
tence of an implied contract. 5 Other courts, focusing on the breach of
Accountants for Negligence in Performance of Professional Services, 26 A.L.R.3d 1438, 1440
(1969). See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 68. "Unlike plaintiffs in an ordinary negligence
action, the client usually does not participate in the procedures in which the attorney's errors
occurred and the client usually lacks the special skill and knowledge necessary to recognize negli-
gence." Id. See also Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1980)("special rules
apply in cases involving particular hardship or other circumstances justifying different accrual
rules").
35. Annotation, supra note 34, at 1440; see MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 92-93.
36. Courts have used the term "accountant" to include "certified public accountants, public
accountants, auditors, bookkeepers, and other independent contractors whose primary responsibil-
ity is to record, report, analyze, verify, or summarize business and financial transactions in books
and accounts." Annotation, supra note 34, at 1439 n.1.
37. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, 613 (4th ed. 1971). "Tort actions are created to
protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm .... Contract actions are created to
protect the interest in having promises performed." Id.
38. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 69.
39. See id. at 67 (attorneys); Annotation, supra note 34(accountants).
40. F. Bowman, The Ten Most Common Causes of Lawyer Malpractice Claims and How to
Avoid Them 41 (April 20, 1989) [hereinafter Bowman] (reprinted for use by the Arkansas Insti-
tute for Continuing Legal Education).
41. L. L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282 Ark. 6, 9, 665 S.W.2d 278, 281 (1984).
42. Atkins Pickle Co. v. Burrough-Uerling-Brasuell Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 275 Ark. 135,
138, 628 S.W.2d 9, 11 (1982) (citing Seaver, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1931)).
43. Legal malpractice actions are said to have a hybrid nature because of the involvement
of both "implied contract and tort theories." MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 68.
44. Topical Survey, Legal Malpractice - Court Holds Legal Malpractice Actions Subject to
Contract Statute of Limitations, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 423, 425 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Harrison v. Casto, 165 W. Va. 787, 271 S.E.2d 774 (1980); Juhnke v. Hess,
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a duty implied by law, state that an action against an attorney lies in
tort.4 6
Although the reported cases involving accountant malpractice are
not as numerous as those involving attorneys or physicians, commenta-
tors note that the principles involved in the legal and medical areas of
professional malpractice may similarly apply to accountants.4 7 One
commentator states that the accountant's situation is more applicable
to a contract statute of limitations.4 For instance, accountants often
perform specific tasks for a client such as the preparation of an income
tax return.49 On the other hand, some courts reason that an account-
ant's negligent performance gives rise to a tort cause of action for
which the tort statute of limitations should apply.50
An Arkansas federal district court provided some clarification on
this issue. In Robertson v. White5 a trustee in bankruptcy brought a
breach of contract action against an accounting firm for its alleged mis-
feasance in the performance of a services contract. In a motion to dis-
miss, the accounting firm argued that Arkansas law establishes that no
breach of contract action could be maintained against it when the com-
plaint alleged that the accounting firm performed the services
"badly."52 The court noted that "the failure to perform a promise im-
211 Kan. 438, 506 P.2d 1142 (1973).
46. Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 239 Kan. 83, 716 P.2d 575 (1986); Cherokee Restau-
rant, Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995 (La. Ct. App. 1983). "Where the gravamen of the action is a
breach of a duty imposed by law upon the relationship of attorney/client and not of the contract
itself, the action is in tort." Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 879, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (1984).
47. Sanbar and Pataki, Professional Liability: Malpractice of Attorneys, Accountants, Ar-
chitects, and Engineers, 3 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 689, 708 (1979).
48. Note, Limitations in Professional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L. REv. 47, 54 (1968).
See L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952) (an action brought
against a certified public accountant for negligently failing to prepare and file a corporation's tax
returns on time was one in contract; consequently, the four-year statute of limitations for contract
actions based upon an instrument in writing was applicable).
49. Many times there exists in the accountant-client relationship an engagement letter or
other document giving rise to a written contract. In such a situation, whether an action for mal-
practice lies in tort or contract will depend on the nature of the wrongdoing giving rise to the
complaint. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
50. Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1973) (three-year tort statute of limitations, and not six-year statute relating to breach of contract
actions, applied to action for negligence against accountants in connection with preparation of tax
returns for plaintiffs, because complaint contained allegations grounded in tort); Carr v. Lipshie, 9
N.Y.2d 983, 176 N.E.2d 512, 218 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961) (although the action claimed was one for
breach of contract, the wrong was tortious and nothing else).
51. 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
52. Id. at 971-72.
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plied in a professional relationship sounds in contract, rather than in
tort."5 However, since the Robertson plaintiff did not allege failure to
perform, but rather alleged that the accounting firm had performed its
duty badly, the court held that the complaint sounded in tort and
granted the motion to dismiss the contract cause of action.54 Thus, the
court distinguished between nonfeasance and misfeasance in determin-
ing whether the action lay in contract or tort.55
The distinction between contract and tort claims becomes impor-
tant when the statutes of limitations vary in length.56 In Arkansas, for
example, the period of limitations for an action based on a written con-
tract is five years after the cause-of action accrues. 57 However, the limi-
tations period for negligence and implied contracts is three years.58 Ar-
kansas courts have declined to apply the limitations period for written
contracts to accountant or attorney malpractice cases.59
After the initial determination of which statute of limitations ap-
plies, the crucial issue is determining when the statute begins to run.60
Historically, courts have used three methods. The traditional view is
that the statute begins to run when the defendant commits a wrongful
or negligent act or omission.61 Commonly called the occurrence rule,
53. Id. at 973.
54. Id. at 974. The court noted that had the contracts between the accounting firm and the
plaintiff contained "any special engagements beyond the promise to audit the books and prepare
the tax returns," the question of whether tort or contract law applied would have been treated
differently. Id. at 972.
55. See also L. L. Cole & Son, Inc., 282 Ark. at 9, 665 S.W.2d at 281 ("a breach of
contract is not treated as a tort if it consists merely of a failure to act (nonfeasance) as distin-
guished from an affirmatively wrongful act (misfeasance)").
56. Bowman, supra note 40, at 44.
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-111 (1987) provides in pertinent part: -(a) Actions on ...
instruments in writing . . . shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action
shall accrue, and not thereafter."
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (1987).
59. Id. See Cotton v. Mosele, 738 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1984); Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown &
Co., 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989); Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989);
Rhoades v. Sims, 286 Ark. 349, 692 S.W.2d 750 (1985); Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 671
S.W.2d 756 (1984).
60. This article focuses on when the statute of limitations begins to run for negligence ac-
tions. ARK CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (1987). Assuming a cause of action against an accountant or
attorney was properly brought under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-111 for breach of a written con-
tract, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that the statute of limitations would begin to run
when a breach of any obligation under the agreement occurs. Rice v. McKinley, 267 Ark. 659,
664, 590 S.W.2d 305, 309 (1979).
61. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 94. According to Mallen and Smith, pursuant to
the occurrence rule, "a statute of limitations commences to run upon occurrence of the essential
facts constituting the cause of action, regardless of whether these facts are discovered by the
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this view applies to malpractice actions against professionals whether
the claim is based on contract or tort theory. 2 The occurrence rule first
appeared in the 1830 case of Wilcox v. Plummer.3 In Wilcox the
plaintiffs hired an attorney named Plummer to recover upon a promis-
sory note.6 Plummer sued Banks, the drawer of the note, but failed to
sue Hawkins, an endorser.65 When Banks proved insolvent, Plummer
brought an action against Hawkins. However, the plaintiffs were mis-
named in the writ, resulting in a judgment of nonsuit against the plain-
tiffs.66 By this time, the statute of limitations had run, barring further
action against Hawkins.6 7 Subsequently, Plummer died and the plain-
tiffs brought a legal malpractice action against his estate. 8 The execu-
tors of Plummer's estate asserted that the three-year statute of limita-
tions barred the claim.6" The United States Supreme Court determined
that the cause of action against Plummer accrued at the time of his
negligence even though the plaintiffs suffered no actual damage at that
time.70 The Court reasoned that once the attorney acted negligently the
contract was violated and an action could be maintained immediately.71
Actual damage was irrelevant in determining when the cause of action
accrued.72 Therefore, the Court concluded that the statute of limita-
tions began running when Plummer issued the writ naming the wrong
plaintiffs. 73
Arkansas follows the occurrence rule regarding professional mal-
practice claims when fraud or concealment are absent.7 4 While Ford's
Inc. is the first case construing when the statute of limitations begins
running on actions against accountants, 75 Arkansas has followed the
occurrence rule with respect to attorneys since 1877. In White v. Rea-
client." Id.
62. Id. at 94 n.l and 98.
63. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
64. Id. at 173.
65. Id. at 180.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 173, 180.
69. Id. at 174.
70. Id. at 182-83.
71. Id. at 182.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 183.
74. Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989) (account-
ants); Rhoades v. Sims, 286 Ark. 349, 692 S.W.2d 750 (1985) (attorneys).
75. 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989).
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gan76 an attorney was negligent in drafting a mortgage document. 77
The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in Wilcox, 78 held that the right of action arose when
the attorney failed to properly draft the mortgage document. The court
stated that "the misconduct or negligence of the attorney constituted
the cause of action, and . . . the statute of limitations began to run
from the time, when the defendant had been guilty of such misconduct,
and not from the time when it was discovered . . . 7.
In Riggs v. Thomas80 the court continued to follow the occurrence
rule in attorney malpractice cases. The Riggs brought an action against
their attorney more than four years after he approved title to land they
were purchasing.81 The Riggs claimed damages because the attorney
failed to include in his title opinion the seller's inability to convey title
to the mineral rights.82 Plaintiffs asked the court to overrule prior case
law, claiming an injustice occurs when the statute has run before the
error is discovered. The court responded that a "contrary rule would
allow a plaintiff to bring suit many years after the damage had oc-
curred and at a time when witnesses might no longer be available."8
Thus, the three-year statute of limitations8" began running on the date
the attorney negligently prepared the title opinion.85
That same year, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an
Arkansas district court decision holding that the three-year statute of
limitations governing attorney malpractice claims begins when the neg-
ligent act occurs, not when the client discovers it. In Cotton v. Mosele8 e
the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision on September 5,
1973. He retained an attorney to handle his claims arising from that
collision.87 The attorney failed to pursue those claims on the plaintiff's
76. 32 Ark. 281 (1877).
77. Id. at 283. The mortgage contained no relinquishment of dower. Id.
78. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
79. White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281, 291 (1877) (quoting Howell v. Young, 5 Barn. & Cress.
259 (1826)).
80. 283 Ark. 148, 671 S.W.2d 756 (1984).
81. Id. at 149, 671 S.W.2d at 756.
8Z. Id.
83. Id. at 149, 671 S.W.2d at 757. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (1987).
85. Riggs, 283 Ark. at 149, 671 S.W.2d at 757. In dicta, the court announced that if there
was to be such a marked change in interpreting statutes that have long been the law, such change
should occur through the legislature and not the courts. Id.
86. 738 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1984).
87. Id.
[Vol. 13:115
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
behalf before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.8 8 In
1983 the plaintiff filed an action for legal malpractice.8 9 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the attorney's negligence occurred
on September 5, 1976, when the time period for bringing an action
based upon the collision ended."0 The statute of limitations began run-
ning on that day for the attorney malpractice claim.91 Thus, the mal-
practice action brought in 1983 was time-barred.92
In 1985 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Rhoades v. Sims.93
In Rhoades an attorney failed to contact his clients regarding his re-
ceipt of a motion for summary judgment and the notice that a hearing
on the motion would be held.9' He also failed to respond to the motion,
resulting in a judgment against his clients in 1979.15 Substitute counsel
entered the litigation which was the subject of the summary judgment
and finally concluded the suit in 1983.96 The first attorney did not re-
present the plaintiffs after May 16, 1979. 91 Plaintiffs filed the malprac-
tice suit in February 1984.98 Relying on earlier decisions, the court
held that the conduct triggering the statute of limitations occurred
more than four years before the plaintiffs brought the claim. Therefore,
the plaintiffs' claim was barred.99
While there is no prior case law in Arkansas construing the appro-
priate time when the statute of limitations begins running for account-
ant negligence, other jurisdictions have considered and applied the oc-
currence rule. In Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand0 0 a grain
company sued its accountants for malpractice in rendering audits of the
company for three successive years.101 The plaintiff alleged that the ac-
countants were negligent in failing to discover and report certain mis-
88. Id. The applicable statute of limitations for the personal injury claims expired on Sep-
tember 5, 1976, three years after the collision. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 339.
91. Id. at 338.
92. Id. at 339.
93. 286 Ark. 349, 692 S.W.2d 750 (1985).
94. Id. at 350, 692 S.W.2d at 750.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 350, 692 S.W.2d at 751.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 352, 692 S.W.2d at 752.
100. 215 Neb. 289, 338 N.W.2d 594 (1983).
101. Id. at 290, 338 N.W.2d at 595.
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representations regarding operations of the company. 1'0 The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began running at
the time the accountants delivered the audit reports or financial state-
ments to the plaintiff. 103
In Holsman Neon & Electric Sign Co. v. Kohn'014 the plaintiff re-
tained the defendant accounting firm in 1964 to supervise, keep, pre-
pare, and audit its books, records, journals, and ledgers. 10 5 In October
1981 the plaintiff discovered that one of its employees had embezzled
approximately $50,000 since April 1978.106 The plaintiff sued the ac-
counting firm for negligence and the accounting firm asserted the stat-
ute of limitations as a defense. 10 7 The Ohio Court of Appeals held that
"[a] cause of action based on an accountant's negligence accrues at the
time of the negligent conduct."' 1 8 The complaint was filed on Novem-
ber 12, 1982, alleging negligence from April 1978 through October
1981.1°9 The court held that the negligent acts which occurred within
four years of the filing of the complaint were actionable. The acts oc-
curring outside this period were properly dismissed.110
Commentators criticize the occurrence rule for denying a client's
remedy before the wrong can be discovered.1 ' They also note that the
rule requires the client to promptly file suit irrespective of whether the
client has or ever will incur actual damages.112 Many states have
adopted other rules to mark the beginning of the limitations period
which ameliorate the effect of, or abandon entirely, the occurrence
rule." 3
An alternative approach, the damage rule, was developed in re-
sponse to problems that arose under the occurrence rule." 4 Under the
damage rule, the statute of limitations commences at the time the
102. Id. at 293, 338 N.W.2d at 596.
103. Id. at 296, 338 N.W.2d at 598.
104. 34 Ohio App. 3d 53, 516 N.E.2d 1284 (1986).
105. Id. at 54, 516 N.E.2d at 1285.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 55, 516 N.E.2d at 1286.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Comment, Legal Malpractice, 27 ARK. L. REV. 452, 473 (1973); MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 33, at 98.
112. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 98.
113. Comment, Legal Malpractice, supra note 111, at 473. For jurisdictions that have used
the occurrence rule, see MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 94 n.l.
114. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 100.
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plaintiff incurs actual damages." 5 This rule first appeared in Fort My-
ers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson.1 6 In Fort Myers the
defendant attorney negligently prepared a contract which resulted in
the seizure of his client's boats by the Venezuelan government.' 1 7 The
disgruntled client brought a malpractice action within three years of
the seizure, but more than three years after the negligent act occurred.
The district court applied the occurrence rule, and held that the three-
year statute of limitations for legal malpractice barred the action.1 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed and adopted the damage rule." 9 The court reasoned that
the statute of limitations in malpractice actions (as in other negligence
actions) should not begin to run until a plaintiff actually suffers an
injury. 12
Courts have also applied the damage rule in actions for accountant
malpractice.'' In Atkins v. Crosland12 2 the plaintiff brought an action
against his accountant for negligent preparation of tax returns. 123 The
court rejected the accountant's contention that the action was barred
by the two-year statute of limitations even though the negligent acts
occurred more than two years prior to the commencement of the
suit.'" The court held that the statute of limitations did not commence
115. Id.
116. 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
117. Id. at 262.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court stated:
With exceptions not pertinent here, the District of Columbia statute requires actions to
be brought within three years 'from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.'
In ordinary negligence actions, this means the time when the plaintiff suffers injury
.... We see no good reason for drawing such a distinction between malpractice suits
and other negligence actions. The impounding of the boats might have been found to be
an injury that resulted from appellees' erroneous legal advice. Since the suit was filed
within three years [of the impounding], we think it was timely.
Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. For a list of jurisdictions applying the damage rule to malpractice actions against
attorneys, see MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 100 n.1.
121. Annotation, supra note 34, at 1444-45 & Supp.
122. 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967).
123. Id. at 152. The accountant allegedly was negligent by originally using the cash receipts
and disbursements method and then switching to the accrual method for the next year without
obtaining the consent of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The accountant also failed to
warn his client of the tax problem this caused, resulting in a tax deficiency being assessed against
the plaintiff. Id.
124. Id.
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until the IRS assessed the tax deficiency. 2 ' The court stated that
before the deficiency was assessed the plaintiff had not been injured,
nor had he sustained damages. Therefore, he did not have a cause of
action." 6
A third method applied by courts to determine when a statute of
limitations begins to run is the discovery rule. Under this rule, the stat-
ute of limitations for professional malpractice commences when the cli-
ent discovers or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have
discovered the negligent act of the attorney or accountant.127 This rule
was first adopted in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gel-
fand.1 8 In Neel the defendant attorneys of the Magana law firm failed
to timely serve a summons after filing the plaintiff's wrongful death
suit. As a result, the plaintiff's case was dismissed on December 10,
1965.129 The plaintiffs did not learn of the dismissal until December 21,
1967.130 Following the occurrence rule, the trial court held that the
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 3' The California Su-
preme Court reversed. It rejected the occurrence rule and adopted the
discovery rule for all professional malpractice actions. 32 The court
noted that because of the high degree of knowledge and skill possessed
by an attorney, a client may be unable to detect a negligent act even if
he sees it.' 33 Also, the court reasoned that the client is often unable to
detect attorney malpractice since attorneys work out of the view of
their clients.' 3" Accordingly, the court held that in attorney malpractice
claims, the statute of limitations begins when the client discovers, or
should have discovered, the facts establishing the cause of action.' 35
Today, the discovery rule is the doctrine most often used in legal mal-
practice actions to determine when the statute of limitations begins.'36
Courts use the discovery rule in accountant malpractice actions as
125. Id. at 153.
126. Id.
127. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 137.
128. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
129. Id. at 179-80, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
133. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 194, 491 P.2d at 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
136. For a list of jurisdictions adopting the discovery rule in legal malpractice cases, see
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 132 n.21.
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well. In Moonie v. Lynch 37 the court held that the statute of limita-
tions in accountant malpractice claims for negligent preparation of a
tax return begins running when the negligent act is discovered."3 8 The
court refused to follow the occurrence rule which existed in California
at that time for legal malpractice claims.' 39 The court stated that until
the client learned of the government's penalty assessed against him, he
had no way of knowing that his tax return had been improperly pre-
pared. 140 The penalty assessed for the accountant's alleged negligence
gave the client his cause of action.'" Several other jurisdictions now
follow the discovery rule with respect to malpractice actions against
accountants." 2
Along with the three previously mentioned rules for determining
when statutes of limitations commence, there is an exception known as
the continuous representation or continuous treatment rule." 3 This rule
tolls or defers the accrual of the statute of limitations.'" With regard
to legal malpractice claims, the continuous representation rule tolls the
statute of limitations as long as the attorney continues to represent the
client." 5 This rule protects the attorney-client relationship. The client
need not immediately seek other counsel because the limitations period
does not accrue as long as the attorney represents the client on the
matter that was allegedly mishandled."' Arkansas recently recognized
the continuous representation rule in medical malpractice actions, but
137. 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1975).
138. Id. at 365-66, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
139. Id. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971), was the first case to
apply the discovery rule.
140. Moonie, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
141. Id.
142. Meinhard-Commercial Corp. v. Sydney, 109 A.D.2d 678, 487 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1985) (the
statute of limitations did not commence until the plaintiff received the financial statements upon
which it relied (citing Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 101 A.D.2d 231, 476 N.Y.S.2d
539 (1984)); Brower v. Davidson, Deckert, Schutter & Glassman, P.C., 686 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (discoverability of the accountant's damage could no longer be denied as of the date
of the IRS's report which calculated the tax deficiency); Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 289
A.2d 1 (1972) (the ooncept that the statute of limitations begins to run when the negligence is
discovered, or when with due diligence should have been discovered, applies to all cases involving
malpractice); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969) (statute of limitations
began to run when the taxpayer received notice of the tax deficiency, rather than when it was
assessed).
143. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 115.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. See Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
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has yet to do so in attorney or accountant malpractice cases.147
A New York court applied the continuous representation rule to a
legal malpractice claim in Wilson v. Econom.' 8 The cause of action
arose when an attorney failed to file the plaintiff's personal injury ac-
tion within the limitations period. 149 When the client questioned the
attorney regarding the status of the case, her inquiries were answered
evasively. She eventually learned that her attorney had left the state. 50
The plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against the attorney.
As a defense, the attorney asserted the three-year statute of limita-
tions. '5 The court expressed concern that an attorney could defeat a
malpractice claim by appearing to represent the client while running
out the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court applied the contin-
uous representation rule and allowed the plaintiffis claim to be brought
against the attorney. 52
The running of the limitations period for professional malpractice
claims is also tolled when the attorney or accountant conceals the mis-
conduct or resulting injury.' 53 Arkansas recognizes this tolling doc-
trine.' 54 However, there are no attorney or accountant malpractice
cases in Arkansas where the court actually tolled the statute of limita-
tions because of -concealment of the wrong. 55 Case law in Arkansas
outside of professional malpractice suits establishes that affirmative ac-
tion to conceal the misconduct would be required on the part of the
person charged in order to toll the statute of limitations. 56
Despite various accrual rules which have developed over the years
in other jurisdictions regarding when the statute of limitations begins,
147. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988). For a discussion of the case, see
Note, Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of Limitations in Medical
Malpractice Actions, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 405 (1988-89) (authored by John D.
Nichols).
148. 56 Misc. 2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
149. Id. at 273, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 274, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383-84.
153. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 33, at 122.
154. Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 149, 671 S.W.2d 756, 757 (1984). "[lt has long been
the law in Arkansas that the statute of limitations in an action against an attorney for negligence
begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when
it is discovered by the client." Id. (emphasis added).
155. For a collection of cases where courts have tolled the statute for an attorney's fraudu-
lent concealment, see Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Upon Action
Against Attorney for Malpractice, 32 A.L.R.4TH 260, 327-31 (1984).
156. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984).
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Arkansas courts continue to follow the occurrence rule. In Ford's Inc.
v. Russell Brown & Co.' the Arkansas Supreme Court extended this
rule to malpractice actions against accountants. With Justice Hickman
speaking for the majority, the court held that in accounting malprac-
tice cases, the statute of limitations begins running, in the absence of
concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs and not when it
is discovered.' 58 While noting that the Arkansas rule is considerably
more restrictive than any of the cases cited by Ford's, the Arkansas
Supreme Court specifically rejected Ford's contentions that the limita-
tions period commenced when the IRS assessed a tax deficiency.' 59 Re-
lying upon the long line of Arkansas cases dealing with attorney and
physician malpractice,6 0 the court saw no compelling reason to adopt a
different rule for accountant malpractice actions.' 6' The court reiter-
ated its conviction that if such a marked change in the law is to be
made in professional malpractice actions, the legislature, not the court,
should make that change.' 62
. Justice Purtle dissented, stating that "common sense and ordinary
reasoning power" should be used to commence the running of the stat-
ute of limitations on the date that Russell Brown conceded that the
IRS was correct and admitted that Ford's owed money. 6 3 Justice Pur-
tle's approach would have brought the suit within the three-year limita-
tions period. 6 4 The dissent appears to agree with the discovery rule,
stating that Ford's was not harmed until it received a demand for addi-
tional taxes.'65
157. 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989).
158. Id. at 429, 773 S.W.2d at 92-93.
159. The court in Ford's relied on Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr.
55 (1975) (see notes 137-41 and accompanying text), along with Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md.
288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969) (see note 142), for this proposition, which is consistent with the damage
rule. However, as the court noted, these cases adhere to the discovery rule. Consequently, the
statute would begin to run when the client received notice of the tax deficiency, rather than assess-
ment. Using the discovery rule, the court noted that the plaintiffis claim would still have expired
since "it could be concluded that appellants knew, or reasonably should have known, of appellee's
negligent conduct by January 1978-which was more than three years prior to the date the appel-
lants filed suit." 299 Ark. at 429, 773 S.W.2d at 92.
160. Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989); Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671,
752 S.W.2d 25 (1988); Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 671 S.W.2d 756 (1984).
161. Ford's Inc., 299 Ark. at 429, 773 S.W.2d at 92.
162. Id. at 429, 773 S.W.2d at 93.
163. Id. at 430, 773 S.W.2d at 93 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Purtle, J., dissenting).
165. Id. "There was no way appellants should have or could have learned ... that they
would owe additional taxes." Id. at 430-31, 773 S.W.2d at 93 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
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Justice Purtle also found that Russell Brown deliberately and in-
tentionally concealed its error or miscalculation in the liquidation plan
until it conceded the IRS was correct in its deficiency assessment. 6
The majority opinion noted, however, that Ford's never alleged fraudu-
lent concealment in its complaint, and even if it had, the only time the
record might have suggested concealment by Russell Brown was when
the parties met with the IRS in January 1977.67 Any concealment at-
tributed to Russell Brown would have ended in September 1978 when
it admitted the IRS was correct. 68 Therefore, following the majority's
reasoning, fraudulent concealment would not have brought this action
within the limitations period.
In Stroud v. Ryan 69 the Arkansas Supreme Court applied a toll-
ing provision to the traditional occurrence rule during a period in which
no claim could have been made. The court first reiterated the rule that
the limitations period begins when the negligent act occurs. 7 ' But, af-
ter considering the issue for the first time, the court added that the
statute of limitations should be suspended during a period when the
party alleging malpractice could not have brought a claim because the
injury ceased to exist for a period of time.1"' The court recognized that,
as a general rule in other jurisdictions, the running of a statute of limi-
tations is tolled during the time a plaintiff is prevented from bringing
the action to which the statute applies. 72
In support, the court cited Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Texas
Power & Light.1 7 3 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals decided to toll the
limitations period when an insurance carrier waited until after a
favorable entry of final judgment in an employee's suit for personal
injuries before bringing a cause of action against the party who injured
the employee.1 74 In another case,17 1 a North Carolina court tolled the
statute of limitations when a creditor lost the ability to sue a municipal
corporation, which had its charter repealed, until a successor corpora-
166. 299 Ark. at 431, 773 S.W.2d at 93.
167. Id. at 429, 773 S.W.2d at 93. At that time, Russell Brown defended its position and
advised plaintiffs that there was nothing to worry about. Id.
168. Id.
169. 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989).
170. Id. at 474, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
171. Id.
172. Id., 763 S.W.2d at 77-78.
173. 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
174. Id.
175. Broadfoot v. City of Fayetteville, 124 N.C. 478, 32 S.E. 804 (1899).
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tion was organized.
Based on this general rule, the court in Stroud did not hesitate to
toll the statute of limitations for the one year and seventy-seven days
during which the default judgment was set aside. 176 During that time,
Stroud had no claim against Ryan, even though the alleged negligent
act had occurred, because Stroud could not have shown injury. 177
Until the decision in Ford's, the Arkansas Supreme Court had not
determined what would trigger the running of the applicable statute of
limitations in accountant malpractice actions. This case brings account-
ant malpractice cases in line with attorney and physician malpractice
decisions in Arkansas.1 78 It is probable that the occurrence rule would
also apply in actions against other professionals such as engineers and
architects.
The court could have opted for a more liberal accrual rule as has
been the trend in most jurisdictions. 179 However, while recognizing the
possible harshness of the occurrence rule, the court left any such
change to the legislature.1 80 This suggests that a more complex fact
situation might present a problem for the court in following a strict
occurrence rule.
The tolling provision recognized in Stroud is a logical exception to
the occurrence rule. There are other theories, however, that the court
could have employed to reach the same result. By using such theories,
the court could have liberalized Arkansas' accrual rule for attorney
malpractice claims as it has done in actions against physicians.' The
court.could have adopted the continuous representation rule since Ryan
continued to represent Stroud after the negligent act occurred until
nine months before Stroud filed the claim against Ryan. 82 This rule
would have the same equitable effect in attorney malpractice actions as
it does in actions against physicians.' 8 3 It would also give the attorney a
176. 297 Ark. at 474, 763 S.W.2d at 76.
177. Id.
178. See White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281 (1877), and progeny of cases discussed in notes 76-
99 and accompanying text. See also Williams v. Edmondson & War, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d
260 (1975).
179. See notes 114-42 and accompanying text.
180. Ford's Inc., 299 Ark. at 429, 773 S.W.2d at 90 (1989).
181. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988). See Note, supra note 147.
182. Stroud, 297 Ark. 472, 473, 763 S.W.2d 76, 77 (1987); see, e.g., Wall v. Lewis, 393
N.W.2d 758, 761 (N.D. 1986) (in all malpractice actions, the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the client knows or with reasonable diligence should know of the injury, its cause, and
the attorney's possible negligence).
183. Lane, 295 Ark. at 675-76, 752 S.W.2d at 27.
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chance to correct his errors before harm results.
In addition, the court could have tolled the statute based on a the-
ory of estoppel. In a Florida case the court applied the estoppel theory
where a lawyer induced his clients not to file a lawsuit against him
based on assurances that either he or his malpractice insurer would
make the clients whole.""' In Stroud the court did not address the fact
that Ryan repeatedly assured Stroud not to worry because Ryan's mal-
practice insurance would pay for the judgment. Therefore, had the set-
ting aside of the default judgment not tolled the statute of limitations,
Stroud would have had no recourse against the negligence of Ryan.
The rule as adopted in Stroud could allow an attorney or accountant to
extinguish a client's claim against him through delay. Ford's and
Stroud leave unanswered what the Arkansas Supreme Court would
recognize as fraudulent concealment that would toll the statute of limi-
tations in professional malpractice claims.
With the decision in Ford's, the occurrence rule becomes further
entrenched in professional malpractice cases. The exception announced
in Stroud is a logical extension of this rule. Whether Arkansas will
change its rule concerning the accrual of professional malpractice ac-
tions remains to be seen. The Arkansas Supreme Court has decided
that the answer to that question rests with the legislature.
Rhonda McKinnis Wheeler
184. Marholin v. Kaye, 503 So. 2d 950 (Fla. App. 1987); accord Gill v. Warren, 751
S.W.2d 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (if facts are such that attorney promised that further litigation
would cure client's problems and lulled the client into inaction, the attorney would be estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense).
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